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CURRENT LEGISLATION

LEsS THAN UNANIMOUS VERDICT IN CIVIL AcTIoNs.-At the
last election, the people of the state of New York voted upon an
amendment to the State Constitution 1 whereby the legislature is empowered to provide by law that a verdict may be rendered by not
less than five-sixths of the jurymen constituting a jury in any civil
case, and at the present time, a law in accordance with this constitutional provision is pending in the legislature.
The tendency in judicial proceedings has been increasingly towards simplifying methods and procedure for purposes of expediency
-that is, to shorten both the time and the cost of litigation. Until
the creation of the Judicial Council,2 there were no official statistics
on the subject, but since that body has started to fuhction, a great
deal of material has been gathered showing the shortcomings of the
3
present system and enabling an estimate of the benefit of this change.
Where the jury is unable to agree, the case is remanded for a
new trial, which works delay and adds to the cost, so as often to make
the cause upon its merits a trivial matter in comparison to the accumulated costs and expenses. While the principal argument advanced for the adoption of a less than unanimous verdict of the jury
is the saving in time and money to both the state and the litigants,
there is also the phase presented by compromise verdicts rendered in
order to avoid disagreements, which do not effect the justice which
the situation requires. 4 Where the verdict is clearly against the
weight of the evidence, the trial judge is given the discretion 5 to set
the verdict aside and grant a new trial, which brings about the same
effect as if the jury had been unable to come to an agreement.0 However, where the case is not quite so clear, these forced compromises
7
are not set aside, but are allowed to decide the matter.
' N. Y. CONST. art. I, §2, amended as follows: "The legislature may
provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not less than
five-sixths of the jurymen constituting a jury in any civil case."
' N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 128.
See Saxe, Civil Judicial Statistics (1935) 10 ST. JOHn's L. REv. 1, at

21, 22; Editorial,94 N. Y. L. J. 1168, Oct. 8, 1935.

'Hamilton v. Oswego Water Works, 22 App. Div. 573, 48 N. Y. Supp. 106,
aff'd, 163 N. Y. 529, 57 N. E. 1111 (1897) ; Driscoll v. Nelligan, 46 App. Div.
324, 61 N. Y. Supp. 692 (1899) ; McCormick v. Rochester Ry., 133 App. Div.
760, 117 N. Y. Supp. 1110, aff'd, 198 N. Y. 510, 92 N. E. 1090 (1909).
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT art. 36, § 549.
'Miller v. Barker Rose & Clinton Co., 173 App. Div. 186, 158 N. Y. Supp.

865 (1916); Cannarozzo v. New York State Railways, 216 App. Div. 243,

215 N. Y. Supp. 156 (1926); Dingman v. Saratoga Taxi Co.. 227 App. Div.
636, 235 N. Y. Supp. 793 (1929) ; Graley v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 235
App. Div. 490, 257 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1932).
'Driscoll v. Nelligan, 46 App. Div. 324, 61 N. Y. Supp. 692 (1899);
Silberberg v. M. Ascher Silk Corp., 208 App. Div. 766, 203 N. Y. Supp. 193
(1924); E. Candia & Co., Inc. v. Rubin, 209 App. Div. 357, 204 N. Y. Supp.
590 (1924) ; Gouch v. Republican Storage Co., Inc., 125 Misc. 791, 211 N. Y.
Supp. 433 (1925).
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Since it is within the discretion of the trial judge to direct the
verdict 8 or to set the verdict of the jury aside and grant a new trial, 9
the deliberation and verdict of the jury are often a mere formality,
so that dispensing entirely with the jury, in certain types of cases,
might not work a hardship. However, this is merely pointed out in
order to show that the elimination of the requirement of a unanimous
verdict by the jury in civil actions would be a small loss. Where there
is more than one judge sitting on a case, it is not required that their
decision be unanimous to decide the case.
Many of the states have been adopting laws permitting less than
a unanimous verdict of the jury in civil cases. However, any legislation authorizing a verdict by less than the whole number of jurors
in any case where a jury trial is a matter of right is unconstitutional 10 unless such legislation is expressly authorized by a constitutional provision.
The right to a trial by jury is one of the oldest of the personal
rights claimed by English-speaking people. It was secured to the
people of England by the Magna Carta, and has subsequently been
embodied in every constitution and similar document adopted both in
England and in the United States.
The Constitution of the United States has as its Seventh Amendment the provision that in suits at common law, where the value in
controversy was more than $20.00, "the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved." The essential elements of a trial by jury, as understood and applied at the common law, were threefold, namely, (1) that
the jury consist of twelve, no more, no less; (2) that the trial be in
the presence and under the superintendence of a judge having power
to instruct the jury as to the law and advise them in respect to the
facts, and (3) that the verdict be unanimous."However, we live under a government of dual citizenship-that
is, we are citizens of the United States and also citizens of the state
in which we live. The Constitution of the United States has given
to the Federal Government only such authority as was delegated to it
by the people in framing the Constitution, and all other authority remains in the states. Each state has also adopted a constitution, wherein it has secured to its citizens the right to a trial by jury. And,
according to the power which the people of the state have given to
its government in its constitution, the state government has the right
to enact its own laws and enforce them.
N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT art. 34. § 457-a.
'See note 5, supra.
10American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464 (1897);
Patton v.
United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 Sup. Ct. 253 (1930) ; see also Cruger v. The
Hudson River R. R., 12 N. Y. 190 (1854).
U Ibid. It is of course true that the Seventh Amendment does not control
the state courts (St. Louis, etc. R. R. v. Brown, 241 U. S. 223, 36 Sup. Ct. 602
[1916]).
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While a state cannot enact laws in direct contravention of the
principles in the Constitution of the United States, that document
does not control state laws and procedures, 12 nor were its requirements as to "due process" meant to interfere with the power of the
state to protect the lives, liberty and property of its citizens, nor with
the exercise of that power in the adjudications of the courts of 1a3
state in administering the process provided by the law of the state.
Trial by jury was not a privilege or immunity of citizenship which
the states were forbidden to abridge, but the requirement of due proctrial was had according to the settled course
ess of law was met if the
14
of judicial proceedings.
Since the right to a trial by jury is secured to the people by the
Constitution of the United States, it cannot be infringed upon by law
or judicial decree, nor can it be impaired by being subjected to unreasonable conditions and restrictions. Also, a denial of any one of
the essential elements or incidents of a jury trial is a denial of the
right to that mode of trial. On the other hand, it is competent for a
state to make any reasonable regulations and conditions as to how
the right shall be exercised, so long as it is not denied or materially
impaired. 15 The Seventh Amendment, of course, applies to the fed-

'Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. v. Cole, 251 U. S. 54, 40 Sup. Ct. 68 (1919) ;
State v. Hadad, 142 La. 69, 76 So. 243 (1917) ; W. S. Forbes & Co. v. Southern
Cotton Oil Co., 130 Va. 245, 108 S. E. 15 (1921).
"In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624 (1891); Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U. S.
262 (1897).
1' Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 (1875)
("Due process of law is process
due according to the law of the land. This process in the States is regulated
by the law of the State.") ; Holden v. Hardy. 169 U. S. 366 (1898).
"American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464, at 468 (1897) ("Power
of state to change the rule in respect to unanimity of juries is not before us
for consideration.") ; Conneau v. Geis, 73 Cal. 176, 14 Pac. 580 (1887) ; State v.
Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37 Atl. 80 (1897) ; State v. De Lorenzo et at., 81 N. J. L.
613, 79 Ati. 839 (1911); Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164 (1873); People v.
Dunn, 157 N. Y. 528 (1899); Smith v. Western Pacific Ry., 203 N. Y. 499,
96 N. E. 1106 (1911) ; McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo. 719, 30 Pac. 293 (1892).
In those states where a law providing for less than unanimous verdict by
jury in civil actions has been declared unconstitutional, the reason has been
because the constitutions of those states made no provision for such laws.
In the case of Utah, while a territory, it had come under the jurisdiction of
federal law. When adopted as a state and a constitution framed, it was provided therein that the "right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate". Since,
under the Federal Constitution, unanimity of verdict is an essential requirement,
without further provision in the constitution, Utah could not adopt a law
allowing a verdict of a lesser number, and therefore a law passed allowing a
verdict of nine of the jurors to govern in civil actions was declared unconstitutional (American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464 [1897]; Springville
v. Thomas, 166 U. S. 707 [1897]).
Where the constitution gave the legislature the right in civil actions to
provide juries of less than twelve, such a provision was held not to imply the
right to accept a less than unanimous verdict (Colorado: City of Denver v.
Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 [1900]. North Dakota: Power v. Williams,
53 N. D. 54, 205 N. W. 9 [19251 ; National Cash Register Co. v. Midway City
Creamery Co., 53 N. D. 256, 205 N. W. 624 [1925]. Wyoming: First Nat.
Bank of Rock Springs, Wyo. v. Foster, 9 Wyo. 157, 61 Pac. 466 [1900]).
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eral courts only.
Thus, although in Minnesota, it had been held 16 that one of the
essential elements of the trial by jury which must be kept inviolate
was the unanimity of the verdict, a law providing for a five-sixths
verdict, after their constitution had been amended therefor, was held
to be constitutional,'1 7 even in a case under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, holding that even though the cause of action arose out
of a federal statute, the law of the forum would apply, the five-sixths
jury verdict being applicable to such a case.
In Missouri, it was held Is that, the constitutional amendment
having been validly submitted to the people, 19 no right under the
United States Constitution was violated by this constitutional amendment authorizing a verdict in a civil case by three-quarters of the
jury.
In many other states, 20 laws providing for less than unanimous
jury verdicts in civil actions have been held constitutional, these laws
providing for various degrees of required concurrence, and basing
same on nature of action, nature of punishment, or nature of court
involved.
Although the way for this new system in our judicial structure
has been paved by the constitutional amendment, this is merely permissive, and although legislation on the matter has been recommended
by the Judicial Council,2 1 the legislature has not as yet acted upon the
suggestion. There remains the question of procedure in carrying it
out. It would not be desirable to have a statute absolutely mandatory
Where the constitution merely provided "the right to trial by jury shall
remain inviolate" without further provision for changes in the jury system as
it obtained under common law and under federal law, laws providing for less
than unanimous jury verdicts were held unconstitutional (Arkansas: Minnequa
Cooperage Co. v. Hendricks, 130 Ark. 264, 197 S. W. 280 [1917]; Wells Fargo
& Co. Express v. Alexander, 133 Ark. 600, 199 S. W. 84 [1917]; Davis v.
H. A. Nelson & Son, 134 Ark. 436, 201 S. W. 511 [1918]. Indiana: Barlow v.
Kellar, 207 Ind. 686, 194 N. E. 356 [1935]; Schembri v. Shearer, 208 Ind. -,
194 N. E. 615 [1935]; New York C. R. R. v. Hazelbaker, - Ind. -, 199 N. E.
425 "6
[1936]).
Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196, 68 N. W. 53 (1896).
' 1Winters v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R., 128 Minn. 260, 148 N. W. 106
(1914); Bombolis v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R., 128 Minn. 112, 150 N. W.
385 (1914).
18
Franklin v. St. Louis & M. R. R., 188 Mo. 533, 87 S. W. 930 (1905).
Garbert v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 171 Mo. 84, 70 S. W. 891 (1902).

'Idaho: State v. Jutila et al., 34 Idaho 595, 202 Pac. 566 (1921). Louisiana:
State v. Sinegal, 51 La. Ann. 932, 25 So. 957 (1899) ; State v. Wooten, 136 La.
560, 67 So. 366 (1915). Mississippi: Ulmer v. Pistole, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So.
522 (1917). Ohio: R. A. Elder & Co. v. Shoffstal et al., 90 Ohio State 265,
107 N. E. 539 (1914). Oklahoma: Oligschlager v. Stephenson, 24 Okla. 760,
104 Pac. 345 (1909); Muldrow v. State, 4 Okla. Cr. 324, 111 Pac. 656 (1910) ;
Shafer v. State, Green v. State, 50 Okla. Cr. 598, 115 Pac. 379 (1911). South
Dakota: Weaver v. Cuff, 52 S. D. 51, 216 N. W. 600 (1927); State v. Cummins, 56 S. D. 439, 229 N. W. 302 (1930). Texas: Bowen v. Davis, 48 Tex.
101.
aLxrlv DOCUMENT (1936) No. 48, p. 6.
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in nature-that is, that in any case at any time, a verdict of five-sixths
of the jurors would be deemed conclusive. This might very easily
result in the failure of many juries to give due consideration to the
matters submitted to them for determination. In view of the long
established sanctity of the unanimous verdict, 22 any change made is
bound to be a radical departure from the old order, and in fairness
and justice, should be less drastic than such an out-and-out alteration.
A compromise procedure that has been suggested 23 is that a verdict should not be received within a certain number of hours of deliberation unless it is unanimous; thereafter, with a lapse of time, a
verdict by a number diminishing with passage of the time of deliberation should be accepted. This follows the method in use in Scotland
and also in several of our own states, namely, Minnesota and
Nebraska.
However, the courts are in a better position to know the needs
and necessities of a particular case, and how much deliberation should
be required, or indeed whether or not a less than unanimous verdict
should be had at all under the circumstances of the case on trial. At
present, if the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict after being kept
together for such a time as is deemed reasonable by the court, they
must be discharged and a new trial ordered.2 4 This is a function
peculiarly within the province of the judicial power and discretion, 25
and therefore this method could be amended by incorporating the new
provision, and, where the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict, after
what seems to the court a reasonable time, they can be recalled and
instructed that a verdict concurred in by five-sixths of the members
of the jury will be accepted as decisive of their findings.
Inasmuch as such matters seem to be more within the province
of the courts than of the legislature, the latter body might merely pass
a statute empowering the courts by rule to provide for the rendition
of a verdict by the concurrence of five-sixths of the jury, declaring,
of course, in this statute, that in a proper case such a verdict may be
rendered. Although it is more desirable that the rules of procedure
be formulated by the courts, under their rule-making power, 26 rather
than by the legislature, it would be most satisfactory that this function
2
be relegated to a body having this as one of its primary purposes. T
' "The unit rule has its origin in the Dark Ages and is one of the commonlaw relics of barbarism and superstition". Judge Henry C. Caldwell, Am. L.
REV. 1904.
' Judge Irving C. Vann, before the Judiciary Committee of the Constitutional Convention of 1915.
N. Y. CIV. PRAC. Acr art. 34, § 463.
'Ingersoll v. Lansing, 51 Hun 101, 5 N. Y. Supp. 288 (1889).
"

N. Y. JuDICrARY

LAw

§ 82.

' See Prashker, The Proposed Civil Practice Law and Rules-A Comment
(1934) 8 ST. JOHN's L. RF.v. 233.
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Since this procedural change has been made possible by the vote
of the people of the state, it is almost mandatory upon the legislature
that they act upon this expression of opinion and enact a law which
will put this new system into operation. By the adoption of one of
the methods suggested, or some-other workable method, there should
be an amelioration of the present crowded conditions of our courts
and a saving in both time and money to the litigants as well as to the
courts, without sacrificing any of the substantive rights of the parties.
ALICE FRIEDMAN.

